Welcome!

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at George Mason University, specializing in monetary theory and the political economy of central banking. My dissertation, The Redistributive Politics of the Federal Reserve, examines how competing coalitions influence the Fed’s control over new money and credit. The first chapter traces Milton Friedman’s shift from technocratic to constitutional thinking and his recognition of the redistributive politics of money. The second interprets the Fed’s early years as a struggle between Wall Street and the farm bloc for monetary control. The final chapter, my job market paper, shows how the Fed’s discretion has enabled special interests to capture monetary policy’s redistributive effects through cases such as its first agency debt purchases, the 1970 Commercial Paper Crisis, and the 1985 Plaza Accord.

My research integrates monetary theory, political economy, and economic history to explain how central banks evolve under political pressure. I examine how institutional arrangements determine who benefits from changes in monetary policy and how these redistributive dynamics shape credibility, independence, and long-run monetary stability.

I view education as an opportunity to help students see economics as a way of thinking about the world. In my courses, I connect theory, history, and institutions to show how incentives shape behavior and policy outcomes. I encourage students to work through models and historical examples, debate contemporary issues, and write reflectively about how economic ideas evolve. My goal is for them to leave class not only understanding economic principles but also appreciating economics as a living conversation about how societies organize and adapt.